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Abstract
This paper estimates, using a large panel data set from rural Bangladesh, the
eects of health shocks on household consumption and how access to microcredit
aects households' response to such shocks. Our results suggest that even though in
general consumption remains stable in many cases when households are exposed to
health shocks, households that have access to microcredit appear to cope (slightly)
better. The most important instrument used by households appear be sales of pro-
ductive assets (livestock) and there is a signicant mitigating eect of microcredit:
households that have access to microcredit do not need to sell livestock to the extent
households that do not have access to microcredit need to, in order to insure con-
sumption against health shocks. The results suggest that microcredit organizations
and microcredit per se have an insurance role to play, an aspect that has not been
analyzed previously.
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One of the biggest shocks to economic opportunities faced by households is major illness to
members of the households. While health shocks can have adverse consequences for house-
holds in both developed and developing countries, they are likely to have a particularly
severe eect on households in the latter, because these households are typically unable to
access formal insurance markets to help insure consumption against such shocks.
The literature on the eects of health shocks on household outcomes in developing coun-
tries is quite large and the results are (surprisingly) mixed. For example Townsend (1994),
Kochar (1995) and Skouas and Quisumbing (2005) nd that illness shocks are fairly well
insured. Others (for example Cochrane (1991), Gertler and Gruber (2002), Dercon and
Krishnan (2000), Asfaw and Braun (2004), Wagsta (2007), Lindelow and Wagsta (2007)
and Beegle, Weerdt, and Dercon (2008) however nd that illness shocks have a negative
and statistically signicant eect on consumption or income. One general conclusion that
could be drawn from the existing literature is that the impact of health shocks is crucially
dependent on the ability of the households to insure against such shocks. In particular
the literature focuses on the role of credit, nancial savings and other assets. For exam-
ple Gertler and Gruber (2002), Jalan and Ravallion (1999), Besley (1995), Udry (1990),
Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993) and Fafchamps, Udry, and Czukas (1998) who all reach
essentially the same conclusion: wealthier households are better able to insure against
income shocks in general and health/illness shocks in particular.
This implies that nancial institutions could have an important role to play in insuring
consumption against income shocks. Unfortunately commercial nancial institutions in
developing countries are, more often than not, weak and do not adequately service the
poor. These institutions are typically not conveniently located, have substantial collateral
requirements and impose large costs on savings (Morduch, 1999). In contrast micronance
institutions hold substantial promise. The micronance programs are typically targeted to
the poor (and the near-poor), do not impose signicant physical collateral requirements
and actively promote savings.1
1We use the terms micronance and microcredit interchangeably, though it needs to be remembered
2The primary aim of this paper is to examine, using data from Bangladesh, the potential role
of microcredit in enabling households to insure consumption against health shocks. Micro-
credit can help smooth consumption in a number of ways. It can help households diversify
income and free up other sources of nancing that can be used to directly smooth con-
sumption. No collateral requirement for microcredit loans means that poor households can
get loans more easily compared to the formal sector alternative. Credit from micronance
organizations and informal sources play a pivotal role in the daily life of households in rural
Bangladesh. The impact of microcredit on income and consumption has been investigated
in the literature. Pitt and Khandker (1998) nd that access to micronance signicantly
increases consumption and reduces poverty. Amin, Rai, and Topa (2003) nd that poor
households that join in a microcredit program tend to have better access to insurance and
smoothing devices compared to those who do not. Pitt and Khandker (2002) nd that
microcredit can help smooth seasonal consumption. Their results indicate that households
participation in microcredit program is also motivated by smoothing seasonal pattern of
consumption and male labour supply, and that the eect of microcredit on consumption
smoothing is greatest in the lean season. However the ability of these households and the
role of microcredit in enabling households to insure against income shocks in general and
health shocks in particular has not been examined previously. In this paper we use data
from one of the largest ever panel data sets consisting of households in both treatment and
control groups to examine the role of microcredit in enabling households insure against
health shocks.
2 The Data and Descriptive Statistics
The paper uses three rounds of a household level panel data set from Bangladesh. This
data is a part of a survey of treatment and control households aimed at examining the eect
of microcredit on household outcomes. While four rounds of the survey were conducted (in
1997-1998, 1998-1999, 1999-2000 and 2004-2005), for purposes of this paper we use data
from the rst, third and fourth round of the surveys. The primary reason for ignoring
that micronance is wider in scope compared to microcredit.
3the second round, is that this survey round did not collect comprehensive information
on consumption.2 All the surveys were conducted during the period December - March,
which implies that seasonal eects can be ignored. The 2004-05 survey contains data on
participation status, including the amount of microcredit borrowing for each year after
year 2000. Many of the participants dropped out of the program for one year or more and
some of the non-participants became participants later.
The survey sampled around 3000 households in 91 villages spread evenly throughout the
country, which were selected to re
ect the overall spread of microcredit operations in
Bangladesh. The attrition rate was low   less than 10 percent from rst round to fourth
round. The nal round of survey consists of 2729 households in 91 villages. Because of
missing data on some key variables for 35 households, our nal estimating sample consists
of a balanced panel of 2694 households. The survey collected detailed information on a
number of socio-economic variables including household demographics, consumption, assets
and income, health and education and participation in microcredit programs.
Previous studies indicate that the measurement of the illness shock variables is important
to detect the impact of illness on growth of consumption. For example, Cochrane (1991)
nds no eect on the growth of consumption when illness is measured as dummy variable
but nds substantial eect (consumption growth decreases by 11   14%) when days of
illness > 100 in the last one year (major illness) is entered as dummy variable for the
sickness. Respondents in our survey were asked about new or ongoing and past illness of
all members in the household. We use this information to compute a number of dierent
measures of household level health shocks. The rst measure that we use is whether any
member of the household was sick during the last 15 days prior to the survey. This measure,
while being simple to understand and compute can suer from measurement error in the
form of self-reporting bias with the more educated and richer people typically reporting
more episodes of days sick. Second, we use the number days sick in the last 15 days for all
working age members of household. This measure reduces some of the problems associated
with the rst measure of illness (see for example Schultz and Tansel (1997) and Dercon and
2The data was collected by the Bangladesh Institute for Development Studies (BIDS) for Bangladesh
Rural Employment Support Foundation with the help of nancial assistance from World Bank. The rst
author was involved in the fourth round of data collection, monitoring and writing the nal report.
4Krishnan (2000)) in that this is a more objective measure and is subject to less reporting
bias. The third measure used is the number of days a member had to refrain from work or
income earning activities if any member in the household was sick in the last 15 days. The
fourth measure is whether the household incurred any big expenditure or loss of income due
to sickness in the past one year. The last measure is whether the main income earner died
in the last one year. The rst three measures capture short-term health shocks while the
last two measures capture long-term health shocks.
The descriptive statistics presented in Table 1, Panel A show some interesting and signif-
icant variations across the three rounds of data that we use for purposes of estimation.
First, 49% of households in the 1997-1998 survey report that some member was sick in the
past 15 days, this goes down to 44% in the 1999-2000 survey and further down to 21% in
2004-2005. 82% of households in the 1997-1998 survey report some sickness in the past
one year, 95% do so in the 1999-2000 survey and 47% in the 2004-2005 survey. Average
number of days lost in the past 15 days due to illness varies from 3.1 in the 1997-1998
survey down to 1.36 in the 2004-2005 survey. The percentage of households experiencing
a large shock in expenditure in the last one year ranges from 15.7% in 1997-1998 to 22.6%
in 2004-2005. Up to 1.5% of households report death of the main earner in the family in
the past one year.
Table 1, Panel B presents descriptive statistics on other socio-economic and demographic
characteristics of the household. The average size of the household varies from 5.63 mem-
bers in 1997-98 to 7.23 members in 2004-05. The years of education attained by the most
education member of the household has increased from 5.48 years in 1997-98 to 7.27 years
in 2004-05. The majority of households are male headed, though it is worth noting that
the proportion of female headed households have doubled over the period 1997-1998  
2004-2005.
The impact of illness shocks on consumption and the ability of households and other
risks sharing institutions to smooth consumption can vary from one item to another. For
example, Skouas and Quisumbing (2005) nd that adjustments in non-food consumption
can act as a mechanism for partially insuring food consumption from the eects of income
5changes. So we use change in food and the change in non-food consumption expenditure as
the two main outcome variables in our analysis. Non-food consumption is measured yearly
since some of the items are purchased occasionally. Data on non-food expenditure includes
items such as kerosene, batteries, soap, housing repairs, clothing, but excludes expenditure
on items that are lumpy (e.g., dowry, wedding, costs of legal and court cases, etc.). We
also exclude expenditure on health and medical care. For each food item, households were
asked about the amount they had consumed out of purchases, out of own production and
from other sources in the reference period. The reference period for the food item dier
depending on the type of food consumed by rural households. Some food items (e.g.,
beef, chicken) are consumed occasionally (once or twice in a month), while others more
frequently (e.g., rice, lentil). We aggregate all consumption, which is valued using the price
quoted by the household (unit value) since commodities dier in terms of quality.3 This
way we obtain information on expenditure on food in the last month prior to the survey.
Table 1, Panel C reports the mean and standard deviation of food and non-food consump-
tion at the household level. Average household consumption varies from 2433 Taka in
1997-1998 to 3214 Taka in 2004-2005.4 There are signicant 
uctuations across the dif-
ferent rounds with a big increase in food consumption between 1997-1998 and 1999-2000.
The share of non-food consumption (including health and medical expenditure) in total
household expenditure is 21.1% in 1997-1998, which declined to 13.5% in 1999-2000 and
then went back to 21.1% in 2004-2005. This change is in non-food consumption expen-
diture in 1999-2000 can be attributed partly to 
oods at the end of 1998, which aected
most of the country.5
Table 2 presents selected descriptive statistics on credit demand and supply. As many as
30% of households had taken some loan from relatives, friends, or others in the past one
year and surprisingly this number has decreased to 18% by 2004-2005. The average amount
of loan taken from other sources (in the past one year) has however increased consistently
3These values are veried using prices collected from the local shopkeepers. These values are then
de
ated using the rural household agricultural index (1997-1998 = 100).
4Taka is the currency of Bangladesh: 1USD = 40 Taka in 1998
5Although 1999-2000 survey took place more than one year after the 
ood, a shock of that magnitude
is likely to, and indeed did, have a fairly long run eect on household behaviour and outcomes.
6from 4657 Taka in 1997-1998 to 9646 Taka in 2004-2005. The percentage of households who
borrowed for consumption purposes has fallen, as has the percentage of households who
borrowed to pay for medical expenses. Average loans taken by microcredit borrowers has
however increased over time, with the percentage increase being highest between 1997-98
and 1999-2000.
3 Estimation Methodology
Complete risk sharing within the community will result in each household belonging to
that community being protected from idiosyncratic risk.6 Consumption will still vary
but only because of the community's exposure to risk. The test for full consumption
insurance is therefore a test of the validity of Pareto Optimality for the economy under
consideration. Since the Pareto optimal consumption allocations are derived from the social
planner problem, it turns out that the planner needs to solve the following maximization

















where s is the probability of state s;s = 1;:::;S, cits household consumption, yits is
household income, is is the time invariant Pareto weight associated with household i;i =
1;:::;I in state s;  is the rate of time preference assumed to be the same for all households,
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ned as the extent to which the growth rate of household

















Equation (4) implies that under the assumption of full consumption insurance individual
consumption cit depends only on the community/village level average consumption ca
t.7
An empirical specication follows immediately. Regress the change in the consumption of
the ith household on the change in the village level average consumption and other explana-
tory variables (for example socio-economic characteristics and health status of household
members). Formally the empirical specication can be written as:
Civt = 0 + 1Hivt + 2Xivt + C
a
vt + "ivt (5)
where Civt is the change in (real) consumption of household i in village v at time t,
Hivt is the health shock faced by household i in village v and time t and the error term
"ivt includes both preference shocks and measurement error and is distributed identically
and independently. The risk sharing model predicts that  = 1 and 1 = 0, i.e., health
shocks should have no role in explaining household consumption growth.8 This way we
can identify whether rural households are vulnerable to transitory shocks such as illness
shocks.
However Ravallion and Chaudhuri (1997) argue that this test gives biased estimates of the
excess sensitivity parameter against the alternative of risk-market failure whenever there
is a common village level component in household income changes. They suggest (and this
is the method that we use in this paper) the use of the following specication:
Civt = 0 + 1Hivt + 2Xivt + v + t + (v  t) + "ivt (6)
7To examine how the Pareto Optimal allocation is attained in a decentralised economy, we assume
the existence of a complete set of Arrow-Debreu securities. The existence of such securities allows us to
decentralise the economy and examine whether full insurance can be attained through market mechanisms
in such an economy. It can be shown that if there exists a complete set of Arrow-Debreu securities, the
equilibrium consumption allocation will be identical to that obtained under a social planner's problem.
8Notice that the empirical specication uses the change in consumption rather than the level of con-
sumption as the dependent variable because in this way potential omitted variable biases caused by the
unobserved household characteristics can be avoided. Our model can therefore be viewed as the rst-
dierence of a random growth model where we allow consumption growth to be dierent in dierent
villages.
8where v represents village xed eects, and t represents the time eects, "ivt is the
household-specic error term capturing the unobservable components of household pref-
erences. Since changes in consumption in response to health shocks are typically charac-
terized by substantial inter-household heterogeneity, we include in the set of explanatory
variables a set of time varying controls at the household level (Xivt). Changes in village-
level consumption values are approximated by including village xed eects (v). Without
village xed eects, the regression may yield biased estimates because of possible corre-
lation between the omitted or unobserved village characteristics and the error term. It
also allows us to control for any aggregate or co-variate risks faced by all households in
the village. The time dummies control for prices, and the interaction of the time dummies
with the village xed eects allows us to control for price changes that are village-specic
over time. All standard errors are clustered at the village level.
If there is perfect risk sharing within the village then change in household consumption
should not be sensitive to the idiosyncratic health shock Hivt, once aggregate resources are
controlled for, i.e., 1 = 0. The alternative of interest is 1 < 0.
As already mentioned, the primary aim of the paper is to examine the role of microcredit
in enabling households insure against idiosyncratic shocks. To examine this, we estimate
an extended version of equation (6) as follows:
Civt = 0 + 1Hivt + 2Xivt + 3(Hivt  Divt) + v + t + (v  t) + "ivt (7)
Here Divt is the treatment status of the household in a microcredit program and is measured
by the amount borrowed. If households are unable to fully share the risk then 1 will be
dierent from zero, and the coecient of interaction of treatment variable and health shock
(3) then represents the eect of microcredit on changes in consumption.9
A major concern in estimating equation (7) is that the estimated coecient of 3 might
be biased. This could be because of two reasons. The rst is self-selection: for example,
some households might choose not to participate in the microcredit program. Additionally
microcredit programs are generally placed in selected villages. Fortunately, the availability
9We also make the following standard assumptions: separability of consumption and leisure, common
rates of time preference and additively separable preferences over time.
9of panel data at the household level allows us to consistently estimate the average treat-
ment eect without assuming ignorability of treatment and without using instrumental
variable (IV) estimation. Since we are using rst-dierence of the consumption variable,
we eliminate the bias caused by households selecting themselves into the program based on
any unobserved characteristic. While the rst-dierencing also eliminates village level un-
observed characteristics that may cause non-random program placement, our use of village
xed eects in the rst-dierenced model accounts for any further village-specic growth
or shocks or unobservables. So, there is no need to look for village level co-variates that may
aect the program availability in a village. The impact of microcredit in mitigating health
shock is identied by the dierence between the treatment and the control households over
time, conditional on controls.
The second reason for this bias is measurement error, which arises largely from the usual
reporting problems. Measurement error of this kind would tend to induce an attenuation
bias that biases the coecient towards zero. In this case, OLS estimates provide a lower
bound for the true parameters.10 With xed eects estimation, measurement error is
likely to exacerbate the bias. So, we estimate the eects of microcredit on consumption
smoothing using instrumental variable (IV) strategy to take into account of the possible
measurement error. Note that the IV method is also useful if treatment status is correlated
with the time-varying unobservables. In the context of Bangladesh there is a natural
instrument available. Microcredit is typically oered to households who are eligible in
the program village11, dened as those households that own less than half-acre land. We
use a dummy variable indicating whether or not the household is eligible in a program
village as the instrument. To be more specic dene E = 1 if the household is eligible
and 0 if not; P = 1 if the household resides in a program village, 0 if not. The relevant
instrument is P E, which takes the value of 1 if the household is eligible and resides in a
program village.12 It is important to note that the ocial eligibility criterion varies slightly
10However, imputation errors in the construction of consumption variable and reporting error in credit
variable may bias the credit coecient upwards (Ravallion and Chaudhuri, 1997). For a positive coecient,
this bias is in the opposite direction of the standard downward attenuation bias due to measurement errors,
so that the net eect cannot be signed a priori.
11Credit is not available or oered to a household not living in a treatment village.
12However, it is to be noted that the primary purpose of using IV estimation here is not to tackle the
endogeneity of program participation. It is more to address the issue of possible measurement error in
10across the dierent microcredit organizations and over time. Discussion with microcredit
borrowers and local ocials of microcredit organizations indicate no signicant dierence
among dierent microcredit organizationsas far as the eligibility status is concerned. Since
land quality and price dier widely among dierent regions, a number of micronance
institutions have in the recent years relaxed the land-based eligibility criterion slightly (i.e.,
households with more land ownership are also eligible for microcredit). Our instrument
is therefore time varying: for the rst survey round (1997-98), our instrument is whether
household owns less than half-acre land or less. We change this eligibility criterion to 0:75
acre for the 1999-2000 survey and to 1 acre for the 2004-2005 survey.
Before proceeding further it is worth re-iterating that we use two dierent outcome mea-
sures: change in food consumption and change in non-food consumption (excluding med-
ical/health expenditure). Remember also that we use a number of dierent measures of
health shock. They are:
 Whether any member of household was sick during the last 15 days prior to survey
(binary variable)
 The number of days sick in the last 15 days for all working age members of household
 The number of days a member had to refrain from work or income earning activities
if any member in the household was sick in the last 15 days
 Whether the household incurred any big expenditure or loss of income due to sickness
in the past one year (binary variable)
 Whether the main income earner died in the last one year (binary variable)
the credit variable. Moreover, we control for household land ownership in our regression so any eect of
land on consumption or other outcomes is adequately addressed. The exclusion restriction is the following:
conditional on land-ownership and other socio-economic characteristics of the household, eligibility is
independent of outcomes, given participation.
114 Estimation Results
4.1 Are Health Shocks Persistent?
The estimation methodology that we use in this paper (see Section 3) depends, crucially,
on the assumption that health shocks are unpredictable and idiosyncratic in nature. Before
we proceed to the results, we examine the validity of this assumption. In particular we
examine whether households that experience health shocks in the current period are more
likely to receive health shocks in the future i.e., whether health shocks are correlated over
time. Morduch (1995) points out that if an income shock can be predicted beforehand,
then households might side-step the problem by engaging in costly ex-ante smoothing
strategies (e.g. diversifying crops, plots and activities). The data in such a situation would
(incorrectly) reveal that income shocks do not matter. Although health shocks are less
vulnerable to this critique than income shocks, the possibility exists.
To examine the issue of whether health shocks are persistent or not, we estimate the
following regression:
Hit = i + Hit 1 + Xit + "it (8)
Here Hit is some measure of health shock. The coecient of interest is . If shocks are
not persistent, i.e., households experiencing a shock in period t   1 are not signicantly
more likely to experience a shock in period t, then  will not be statistically signicant.
Equation (8) is estimated as a xed eect logit, with survey round dummies. Note that
equation (8) is essentially a dynamic panel data regression model and the presence of
the lagged dependent variable (Hit 1) results in an endogeneity problem. This implies
that the xed eects logit regression would give us biased and inconsistent estimates. To
address this issue we use IV estimation, where the period t   2 (Hit 2) shock variable is
used as an instrument for the lagged dependent (potentially endogenous) variable. This
is specication IV1. In an alternative specication we use a set of exogenous variables
to construct valid instruments for lagged dependent variable. This is specication IV2.
Here we add household level characteristics with two period lag as instruments. We report
results for the xed eects and the two IV specications in Table 3. None of the coecient
12estimates are statistically signicant at the conventional level (the t-ratio is always less
than 1), irrespective of the shock variable that we use. These results imply that the health
shocks as dened above are large, idiosyncratic and unpredictable and are relevant for
studying the implications of the full insurance model.
4.2 Basic Results
Table 4 presents the results of the regression of equation (6) for the dierent specications,
with and without village and time xed eects. The set of control variables Xivt includes
demographic characteristics of the household head, household size and composition, edu-
cational attainment and the amount of arable land owned by the household.
The baseline results presented in Table 4 indicate that health shocks experienced by the
households do not have a statistically signicant eect on changes in food or non-food
expenditure.13 Household consumption appears to be well insured against health shocks.
It is worth noting that the estimated coecients do not dier much with or without village-
year xed eects. This means that households rely almost exclusively on self-insurance to
smooth consumption and that full insurance model at the village level may not be a correct
specication for the sampled households. Similar results were obtained by Kazianga and
Udry (2006) in case of rural Burkina Faso.
Table 5 presents the regression results for the extended baseline specication (equation
(7)). Our interest is to examine whether participation in microcredit programs (measured
by the amount of loans borrowed from a microcredit organization) help households better
insure against health shocks of the kind discussed above. If microcredit does have a role to
play in this respect the coecient estimate of the interaction term (b 3) should be positive
and statistically signicant. It is interesting to note that this dierence estimate is always
positive (though not always statistically signicant). There are therefore some mitigating
eects of microcredit: the more credit the household has access to, the greater is the ability
of the household to insure against health shocks.
13Note that the data on non-food consumption expenditure is available only at the year level. Accord-
ingly we consider only the year level shock variables.
13The IV/2SLS estimate of the eects of microcredit on consumption smoothing are presented
in Table 6. Note that while neither the non-interacted term nor the interaction term is ever
statistically signicant, the signs are in the right direction: the coecient estimate of 1 is
always negative and the coecient estimate of 3 is always positive. The IV estimates of
3 are always larger than the corresponding OLS xed eects estimates presented in Table
5. This indicates the measurement error in credit variable is indeed a possibility.
Given space constraints, we do not present the results for the additional controls, but they
are available on request. However it is to be noted that the additional controls do not have
a consistent and meaningful interpretation. In general we nd that most of the household
composition variables do not have a statistically signicant eect on changes in household
consumption.
4.3 How do Households Insure?
It appears (see Tables 5 and 6 and discussion in section 4.2) that health shocks do not
have a statistically signicant eect on household consumption. However, this need not be
the end of the story. Indeed, it is important to examine what are the relevant institutions
that enable households to insure against health shocks of this kind: after all markets in
developing countries are incomplete. Our analysis thus far does not tell anything about
how households insure. We next address this issue.
Potentially households could use a number of dierent means to insure consumption against
income shocks. Morduch (1995) categorizes the dierent mechanisms into two broad cat-
egories: ex-ante income smoothing and ex-post consumption smoothing. The data set
available to us enables us to examine the role of certain institutions in this context. In
particular we focus on the role of credit, on the role of livestock and on the role of other as-
sets. All of these can be categorized as being institutions that enable ex-post consumption
smoothing by households.
Suppose, for example, households are able to borrow more in response to health shocks.
In this case, we might not observe any changes in consumption as a result of health shocks
14faced by the households since they have engaged in ex-post consumption smoothing having
already borrowed the amount of money to be either spent on health related expenditures
and/or maintain the current level of consumption expenditure. For example access to
microcredit might free up other sources of nancing that can be used to directly smooth
consumption. To explore this issue we examine whether the household responds to shocks
by borrowing from any other source. The estimated equation takes the following form:
Livt = 0 + 1Hivt + 2Xivt + v + t + (v  t) + "ivt (9)
A positive and statistically signicant estimate of 1 implies that a household responds to
a health shock by borrowing more from other sources.
We use three alternative measures of loans from other sources:
1. whether any loan was taken in the last one month (binary variable);
2. amount of loan taken in the last one month; and
3. amount of loan taken in the last one year
On the other hand we consider two health shock variables:
1. whether any member of the household has been sick in the last 15 days
2. whether the main household earner died in the last one year
The Fixed Eects Logit and the Random Eects Tobit regression results presented in Table
7 show that the death of the main earner in the household is associated with increased
borrowing in the last one year. This result indicates that long term health shocks increase
borrowing from other sources, such as relatives, friends or informal money lenders.
Households can also insure consumption by selling productive (for example livestock) or
non-productive (for example consumer durable) assets.14 Households that have access to
14The value of consumer durable is the aggregated current market value of items like radio, fans, boats
and pots that are owned by the household. The information on the stock of assets is available only at the
year level.
15microcredit might have focused on its asset building and on the creation or expansion of
one or more income generating activities compared to households that do not. Similarly,
livestock is a very important asset in rural Bangladesh. A considerable portion of the
households in our sample save in the form of investment in livestock. Almost all the
households possess some livestock (e.g., cows, goats, chicken, ducks, etc.). There has been
a considerable attention paid by previous studies on the role of livestock as a buer stock.15
To examine the issue of how purchase and sale of assets and livestock is used to smooth
consumption in response to health shocks, we estimate an equation similar to equation (7):
the only dierence being that here the dependent variable is the change in the values of
assets owned by the household. The estimated equation is:
Aivt = 0 + 1Hivt + 2Xivt + 3(Hivt  Divt) + v + t + (v  t) + "ivt (10)
Here Aivt measures the change in ownership of non-land asset or livestock over two suc-
cessive rounds of the survey. A negative and statistically signicant 1 implies that the
household reduces its ownership of assets or livestock in response to a health shock. A pos-
itive and statistically signicant 3 implies that access to microcredit reduces the impact
of the health shock and households do not need to take re-course to sale of assets to insure
against health shocks. The 2SLS and OLS xed eects estimates of the mitigating eects
of microcredit on sale of assets and livestock are presented in Table 8. While the coecient
estimates of 1 and 3 do not have a systematic pattern in the case of change in ownership
of non-productive assets, those for the change in ownership of livestock are much more
systematic. The coecient estimate associated with the health shock variable is always
negative and generally statistically signicant in the change in value of livestock regres-
sions. In addition, the dierence estimate is generally positive and statistically signicant
15Fafchamps, Udry, and Czukas (1998) nd limited evidence that livestock inventory serve as buer
stock against large variation in crop income induced by severe rainfall shock. They nd that livestock
sales compensate for 15-30 percent of income shortfalls due to village level shock. On the other hand in
their study of consumption insurance and vulnerability in a set of developing and transitional countries
Skouas and Quisumbing (2005) nd that loss of livestock do not have a signicant negative eect on the
growth rate of consumption per-capita. Kazianga and Udry (2006) also nd little evidence of the use of
livestock as buer stocks for consumption smoothing. Instead they nd households rely exclusively on
self-insurance in the form of adjustments to grain stocks to smooth out consumption. Park (2006) nds
that households who do not live very close to other households do sell o their livestock and other assets
when experience a shock.
16implying that households with access to microcredit are less likely to sell livestock in order
to insure against health shocks. However the total eect is generally still negative (and
statistically signicant), implying that even these households (with access to microcredit)
are not fully able to insure against health shocks and need to sell assets and livestock (in
particular) to insure consumption.
4.4 Income Smoothing and Consumption Smoothing
Next we estimate the extent to which households are able to insure consumption. This
magnitude is critical for assessing the importance of our ndings for welfare and for consid-
ering their policy implications. Rather than directly examining the impact of microcredit,
here we examine the role of transitory changes in income on consumption smoothing. If
permanent income hypothesis model holds, then household would smooth consumption
when facing temporary income 
uctuations. We measure the extent to which households
are not able to insure consumption against illness as the share of the costs of illness that
are nanced out of consumption. To do so, we estimate a model of the eect of changes in
(net of medical spending) income on the growth of consumption. Specically, we estimate
the following regression:
Civt = 0 + 
Yivt + Xivt + v + t + (v  t) + "ivt (11)
where Yivt is income minus medical care expenditure of household i in village v in year t.16
If there is perfect income insurance within a village, then changes in household income will
have no eect on consumption after controlling for common village and time eects, i.e., 
 =
0. Income is however potentially endogenous because of the correlation of the error term
with the growth in income and consumption. It is also likely to be measured with error. So
we account both endogeneity and measurement error in income by instrumental variable
estimation of equation (11). We use the health shock variable as the relevant instrument
16Income includes earnings from self-employment and business activities, net wages earned, net prots
from crop and livestock production. It excludes net borrowing or savings and gifts received. It is to be
noted that income is measured annually. So seasonal variation of income is not captured in our data.
Some of the categories of income (such as income from household production and working in a household
enterprise) are imputed.
17for changes in income under the assumption that changes in consumption due to changes in
income is due only to changes in income due to health shock. Table 9 presents the OLS and
2SLS results of the estimated coecient 
. OLS estimates show that there is a signicant
but very small relationship between income changes and consumption changes. A 100 Taka
increase in income is estimated to increase total (food and non-food) consumption by only
0.43 Taka. 2SLS coecients are larger but are not statistically signicant. This is possibly
due to the lack of sucient variation in income changes in response to health shocks.17
The results essentially suggest that households are not fully able to smooth consumption
in response to transitory income shocks and transitory income shocks induced by health
shocks can have a long term eect on consumption. The coecient estimates suggest
that a 100 Taka increase in income is estimated to increase food expenditure by 12 Taka.
The eects are much stronger for non-participants. A 100 Taka increase in income is
estimated to increase consumption expenditure by 38 taka for the control group, while it
does increase only by 1.3 Taka for the treatment group. Since health shocks reduces income,
a positive coecient, albeit indirectly, indicates that health shocks have negative in
uence
on consumption smoothing and that the results are stronger for the control households.
4.5 Using Alternative Estimation Techniques
Our identication strategy is based on the implicit assumption of separability between con-
sumption and health status. Otherwise, health status would change the marginal utility of
consumption (see for example Gertler and Gruber (2002)). Therefore, 1 in equation (6)
might not be an unbiased estimator of the eect of idiosyncratic shock on changes in con-
sumption because health shock may be correlated with omitted preferences (error term),
biasing the estimated value of 1 in equation (6). There are some additional estimation
issues that need to be considered here. For example the perception of being sick or being
healthy can vary considerably across households. This could lead to a signicant mea-
surement error problem. If measurement error is random, then we do not need to worry
17We use number of days sick in previous year as instrument for change in income. We also experiment
with other health shock variables using these as instruments for changes in income, but none of them
capture enough variation of changes in income   a result consistent with our earlier ndings in regard to
changes in consumption
18about this. However, it is possible that likelihood of reporting illness is closely related to
the socio-economic status of the household (for example the income of the household or
the education level of the most educated member of the family). Additionally, our sample
consists of households who have been exposed to the treatment and those who have not
been. If households in the treatment group have a better knowledge about how to prevent
sickness, or have better coping strategies because of training provided by the microcredit
providers then we could expect that either households in treatment group are system-
atically less exposed to shock or even when they experience such a shock we would not
observe signicant changes in consumption because of the specic design of the microcredit
program.
We can indeed adopt an IV strategy here to control for time-varying unobserved hetero-
geneity aecting the changes in consumption and health shocks.18 For this, we need to
search for a variable that is correlated with health shock but does not directly aect the
changes in consumption expenditure and the variable is not correlated with idiosyncratic
error term. Remember that past health does not have any persistent or permanent eects
on current health. We cannot therefore use lagged health shock as instrument for current
health shock. We experimented with past family income/consumption/household charac-
teristics as the relevant instrument, but none of these appeared to be satisfactory. Lacking
an identifying instrument, we choose to adopt the propensity score matching (PSM) strat-
egy of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) that is now widely used in the program evaluation
literature.19 Typically we would expect that the likelihood of reporting illness is closely
related to individual/household characteristics. We therefore match households based on
their socio-economic status. We include a number of household characteristics and restrict
our analysis to the matched sample. This controls for heterogeneity in initial socioeconomic
conditions that may be correlated with subsequent health shocks and the path of consump-
18Unobserved heterogeneity that is time invariant in this context is automatically captured by our
regression specication. The vector X in the regression controls for observed heterogeneity.
19In our case, PSM compares households who reported illness to those that did not, with the same
(or similar) values of those variables thought to in
uence both illness and consumption. We can think
households reporting illness in our sample as treatment group and the households that did not as the control
group, following the program evaluation literature. Under the matching assumption, the only remaining
dierence between the two groups is reported sickness. Any dierence in outcome between these two groups
can be entirely attributed to the sickness eect provided we are able to have made sucient arguments to
guarantee that there are no further systematic dierences between these two groups.
19tion growth. To estimate the propensity score we estimate a conditional xed-eects logit
model with binary dependent variable whether a member of household was reported to
be sick (=1) or not (= 0) using the panel data. So, unlike a cross-sectional propensity
score estimate, we control for unobservables that might in
uence households reporting of
sickness. We then discard observations that do not have any common support, and obser-
vations with households having very low or very high probability of sickness. We consider
a caliper matching method, which uses all of the comparison units within a predened
propensity score radius. Therefore, we use only as many comparison units as are available
within the calipers, allowing for the use of extra (fewer) units when good matches are (not)
available (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002). We set the radius less than or equal to 0.00005, and
discard about one-third of the observations from the sample (these do not have common
support within this propensity score range). We combine matching with IV approach (to
account for measurement error) to estimate the eects of health shocks and the role of
microcredit in mitigating the consequences of health shocks. The results are reported in
Table 10. The sign of the estimated coecients are similar to that of 2SLS estimates using
the full sample. The magnitude of the health shocks coecients are, in general, larger using
matched sample. The interaction terms of loan and health shock variables also indicate
a larger coecient estimates and most of them are statistically signicant. Our results
are again indicative of the role of microcredit in insuring households against idiosyncratic
health shocks.
5 Conclusion
This paper examines, using a large panel data set from Bangladesh, the ability or otherwise
of poor households to insure against idiosyncratic and unanticipated health shocks. Also,
we assess the role of microcredit. Our results suggest that even though consumption
remains stable in many cases when households are exposed to health shocks, households
that have access to microcredit appear to cope (slightly) better. The most important
instrument used by households appear be sales of productive assets (livestock). There is a
signicant mitigating eect of microcredit: households that have access to microcredit do
20not need to sell livestock to the extent households that do not have access to microcredit
need to, in order to insure consumption against health shocks. The results therefore suggest
that microcredit organizations and microcredit per se have an insurance role to play, an
aspect that has not been analyzed previously. The welfare implications of microcredit
therefore remain high.
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27Table 3: Persistence of Health Shock. Coecient Corresponding to the Lag Health Shock
Variable
   Fixed effects  IV1 IV2 
-0.193 0.1 0.005  Whether any household member is sick in 
period t-1  (6.78) (0.266)  (0.127) 
     
Whether incurred any big expenditure   0.002 3.543 -0.169 
or income loss due to sickness in period t-1  (0.003) (14.081) (0.453) 
     
-0.016 1.106  -0.12  Death of the main family member in period 
t-1 
  
(0.023) (2.145) (0.162) 
Notes: 
Clustered Standard errors are reported in parentheses 
IV1 includes only two period lagged value of the dependent variable as instrument, IV2 adds 























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































30Table 6: 2SLS Estimates of the Eect of Health Shocks on Changes in Consumption and
the Mitigating Eects of Microcredit
Dependent Variable  Change in 
 Food  Expenditure  Non-Food 
Expenditure 
-2.32   Whether any household member is sick
1
(2.65)  
Shock * Treatment  14.2   
 (16.1)   
Number of days sick
1 -0.086  
 (0.132)   
Shock * Treatment  0.51   
  (0.79)   
Number of Working days lost
1 -0.259   
 (25.97)   
Shock * Treatment  0.554   
 (0.638)   
-1.43 -15.49  Whether household incurred any big 
expenditure or income loss due to sickness
2
(1.77) (18.26) 
Shock * Treatment  18.4  209.4 
 (22.7)  (231.3) 
Death of the main family earner
2 -3.67 -40.66 
 (4.48)  (37.94) 
Shock * Treatment  39.4  418.2 
 (44.2)  (373.7) 
Notes 
Each set of coefficients is obtained from a separate regression of changes in outcome variable on health 
shock variables (left side of the table) and their interaction with instrumented loan variable. Each 
regression also incorporates village fixed effects, time effects and their interactions.  
Shock * Treatment coefficients are multiplied by 100.  
1: coefficients are divided by 100 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































32Table 8: Eect of Health Shocks on Change in Ownership of Assets and Livestock
   Change in Assets  Change in Livestock 
    OLS  2SLS OLS 2SLS 
   0.0501  -7.94  Whether any household 
member is sick in the last 15 
days     (0.2217)  (4.657)+ 
Shock * Treatment     -0.12  129.7 
     (1.38)  (75.4)+ 
Number of days sick      0.0038  -0.7878 
     (0.0082)  (0.8989) 
Shock * Treatment     0.0317  4.79 
     (0.01)*  (5.4) 
Number of Working days lost     -0.0014  -2.207 
     (0.0042)  ‘(1.271)+ 
Shock * Treatment     0.029  5.4 
     (0.03)  (3.1)+ 
3.013 -11.58  -193.87  -15.20  Whether household incurred 
any big expenditure  
or income loss due to sickness   (1.233)**  (22.562) (229.19) (12.241) 
Shock * Treatment  5.45  208.5  0.588  191.1 
 (6.68)  (303.16)  (0.707)  ‘(155.2) 
Death of the main family 
earner 
-2.472  -46.80 -1.837 -38.59 
 (2.675)  (52.66)  (0.576)  (18.86)** 
Shock * Treatment  -29.3  408.7  -0.91  362.7 
   (11.95)**  (519.0)  (2.92)  (186.0)+ 
Notes: 
Clustered Standard errors are reported in parentheses 
+ significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1%. 
Regressions include Village Fixed Effects, Time Effects and Village * Time Fixed Effects 
Shock * Treatment coefficients are multiplied by 100.  
 
 
33Table 9: OLS and 2SLS Estimates of Income Smoothing and Consumption Smoothing
   OLS  IV 
All Households  0.0043  0.1217 
 (0.0009)*  (0.1139) 
Treatment Group: Microfinance  0.0033  0.0132 
 (0.0010)*  (0.0426) 
Control group: Microfinance  0.0053  0.3831 
   (0.0014)*  (0.7315) 
Notes 
Clustered Standard errors are reported in parentheses 
+ significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1%. 
The coefficients reported in column 3 are 2SLS estimates of the effects of income changes on total 
consumption changes, respectively. 
Each regression includes set of controls. 
The instrument for change in income is a number of days sick in last one year by income-earning 
household member. 
Table 10: OLS Fixed Eects Estimate of the Eects of Health Shocks Using Matched
Sample
 Food  Non-food  Asset  Livestock 
-0.497     -9.50  Whether any household member is sick in the 
last 15 days
1
(0.990)     (5.099)+ 
Shock * Treatment  13.02     178.8 
  (18.85)     (97.1)+ 
Number of days sick
1 -0.0702    -0.9604 
 (0.1235)     (1.081) 
Shock * Treatment  0.364     5.04 
  (0.639)     (5.60) 
Number of Working days lost
1 -0.02     -0.262 
  (0.0277)     (0.139)+ 
Shock * Treatment  0.502     6.9 
  (0.722)     (3.6)+ 
-1.11 -25.42 -8.87  -9.66  Whether household incurred any big 
expenditure or income loss due to sickness
1
(1.834) (12.01)**  (8.78)  (4.49)** 
Shock * Treatment  18.4  300.3 102.8 120.4 
  (28.4) (1.486)**  (1.087) (55.7)** 
Death of the main family earner
1 -3.74 -145.00  -54.83 -38.59 
  (6.34) (92.06)  (58.23)  (18.86)  ** 
Shock * Treatment  39.9 1362.7  463.9  362.72 
  (58.2) (8.456)  (5.349)  (186.04)+ 
Notes: 
Clustered Standard errors are reported in parentheses 
+ significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1%. 
Each set of coefficients is obtained from a separate regression of changes in outcome variable on health 
shock variables (left hand side of the table) and their interaction with instrumented loan variable.  
Each regression also includes village fixed effects, time effects and their interactions. 
The number of matched sample is determined by propensity score, where a household is considered in 
the regression if we find another household with estimated propensity score lies within a range of 
0.00005. 
Shock * Treatment coefficients are multiplied by 100.  
1: coefficients are expressed in terms of per thousand Taka of the dependent variable 
34